Précis: We use signal detection theory to measure vulnerability to phishing 55 attacks for two interrelated tasks: detection, deciding whether an email is phishing, and 56
behavior, deciding what to do with an email. Although participants exhibited cautious 57 behavior, they still succumbed to phishing attacks due to their limited detection ability. 58
Quantifying Phishing Susceptibility for Detection and Behavior Decisions 59
Phishing is among the top cyber attack vectors (Symantec, 2016; Verizon, 2016 ) 60 threatening individuals, corporations, and critical infrastructure (Wueest, 2014) . These 61 attacks seek to trick users into thinking an email or website is legitimate, hoping to 62 convince them to divulge usernames and passwords, or inadvertently install malware by 63 clicking on malicious links or attachments. Depending on the level of deception involved, 64 it can be difficult to screen such messages automatically. As a result, human judgment 65 plays a role in all cybersecurity systems and, by many accounts, is its weakest link 66 (CERT, 2013; Cranor, 2008) . 67
We use signal detection theory (SDT) methods to assess phishing vulnerability by 68 treating phishing detection as a vigilance task (Mackworth, 1948 for analyzing system vulnerability, as well as for designing and evaluating interventions 75 to reduce it, such as training, incentives, and task restructuring (Mumpower & 76 McClelland, 2014; Swets et al., 2000) . Such research meets a growing need to integrate 77 human decision-making and perceptual ability into cybersecurity systems (Boyce, 2011; 78 Proctor & Chen, 2015) . 79
The premise of SDT is the need to separate users' sensitivity or d' (i.e., their 80 ability to tell whether an email is phishing) from their response bias or c (i.e., their 81 tendency to treat an email as phishing) (Macmillan & Creelman, 2004) . Accuracy 82 measures such as the number or proportion of successful phishing attacks are incomplete 83 because they ignore other objectives, such as opening legitimate emails promptly. SDT 84 accommodates the inevitable tradeoff between hit rates (H, correctly identifying a signal) 85 and false alarm rates (FA, incorrectly identifying noise as signals). 86
The present study demonstrates a procedure for estimating individual users' 87 sensitivity and response bias for phishing, in examining performance on two interrelated 88 tasks: (a) detection, deciding whether an email is legitimate and (b) behavior, deciding 89 what to do with an email. Unlike many signal detection tasks, where the contingent 90 behavior is straightforward (e.g., rescreening detected bags entails minimal costs for false 91 positives; Wolfe et al., 2007) , with phishing, detection and behavior decisions are not 92 uniquely coupled. For example, not falling for a phishing email might reflect 93 discrimination or disinterest. As a result, we study detection and behavior separately in 94 order to assess their respective contributions to vulnerability. 95
Because behavior has more immediate consequences than detection, we expected 96 greater caution with behavior (Lynn & Barrett, 2014 ). However, we had no reason to 97 expect differences in sensitivity, unless the more immediate consequences of the behavior 98 task elicit greater effort, revealing discrimination ability not tapped by detection. 99
Factors that Influence Signal Detection Estimates 100
Previous signal detection research has identified a variety of task, individual, and 101 environmental variables that can affect performance (Ballard, 1996) . Here, we study 102 behavior as a function of participants' awareness of two such variables: (a) signal base 103 rate (i.e., how frequently the signal appears) and (b) costs for correct and incorrect 104 choices (Coombs, Dawes & Tversky, 1970; MacMillan & Creelman, 2004 
The first term is the likelihood ratio of a stimulus being a signal (s) or noise (n); p is the 114 base rate of the signal; the bracketed term is the cost ratio, incorporating the cost of false 115 alarms (FA), true negatives (TN), misses (M), and hits (H); and is a measure of bias 116 related to c and d' (as seen in the final term). When the likelihood ratio is greater than , 117 an observer should treat the stimulus as a signal. Assuming that d' remains constant with 118 changes in task, c should respond to changes in p and the cost ratio (Lynn & Barrett, 119 2014). We consider both task features in the study design. 120
Signal base rate. Due to the volume of legitimate email traffic and the use of 121 automatic screening programs, phishing emails typically have a low base rate (< 1%) 122 (Symantec, 2016; Verizon, 2016) . In the context of baggage screening, Wolfe et al. 123 (2007) describe a prevalence effect, whereby users are biased toward identifying stimuli 124 as noise when there is a low base rate, leading to low hit and false alarm rates. The 125 demands of experimental research typically lead to tasks with artificially high base rates(e.g., Mohan et al., 2012) in order to keep costs down and participants engaged. 127
Participants are, however, typically not told the base rate, leaving it unclear whether they 128 assume a low base rate (as in their lives) or a much higher one due to the experimental 129 context ("they wouldn't ask me to look for phishing emails, if they weren't going to 130 present them fairly often"). They may also infer the base rate based on their intuitions 131 regarding whether experimental stimuli are signals or noise (Wolfe et al., 2007) . Here, we 132 examine the effects of explicitly informing participants that the phishing base rate is 50%. 133
If participants who receive no notice infer a 50% base rate, then notification should have 134 little effect. If they infer a lower base rate, then their c should be much higher, indicating 135 less caution regarding attacks. 136
Costs. The consequences of successful phishing can vary widely across domains. 137
The cost of failed detection could be very high, as with critical infrastructure (e.g., an 138 electrical grid blackout), or fairly low, as with a personal laptop (e.g., an annoying virus). 139
Often, users have little direct guidance about those consequences, beyond general 140 cautionary messages (Carpenter, Zhu & Kolimi, 2014) . They may also have limited 141 opportunities to learn from experience, as when time separates the attack and its damage 142 or when users provide portals to attack distant targets. Incentives may also be misaligned, 143 as when individuals bear the costs of avoidance actions, while the benefits accrue to the 144 system (e.g., Herley (2009) discusses rational rejection of security advice). 145
In detection tasks without a clear payoff structure, participants typically try to 146 maximize accuracy (Maddox, 2002) , which would produce c = 0 (at a 50% base rate). 147 However, phishing avoidance is an everyday task. In order to capture participants' natural 148 cost expectations, as best we could, we did not impose a cost structure, but compared cfor the detection and behavior tasks, expecting less caution for the former, with its 150 reduced costs. Within each task, we expected individual participants' c values to be 151 correlated with their judgments of the consequences of falling for a phishing attack. For 152 the participants notified of the 50% base rate, we assume that equals the cost ratio. If 153 the base rate notification condition has no effect, we can make the same assumption for 154 the participants without the notice. If the costs of hits (correctly identifying phishing 155 emails) and true negatives (correctly identifying legitimate emails) are minimal, then > 156 1 (and hence c > 0), implies a cost ratio with lower costs for misses and greater costs for 157 false alarms. Thus, participants who judge the consequences of misses to be worse should 158
have < 1 and a negative (or more cautious) c. 159
Factors that Influence Phishing Susceptibility 160
Individuals' performance reflects both their ability and how well they apply it. In 161 order to disrupt that application, attackers choose cues designed to evoke heuristic 162 thinking and reduce systematic processing. . We also use a 175 measure of dispositional suspiciousness, expecting those higher on that trait to perceive 176 worse consequences and be more cautious, but not to differ in their discrimination ability. 177
Aim of Study 178
We (1) demonstrate an approach applying SDT to phishing detection, (2) answer?" (50-100%) (confidence); and (4) "If this was a phishing email and you fell for 228 it, how bad would the consequences be?" (1= not bad at all; 5=very bad) (perceived 229 consequences). Experiment 2 randomly assigned participants to answer either question 1 230 or 2, rather than both. 231
To calculate d' and c, the behavior decisions were converted to binary data. 232
Responses of "click link" and "reply," the two actions that could expose users to negative 233 consequences, were interpreted as indicating that participants saw the message as 234
We included 4 attention checks. At the beginning, two multiple-choice questions 236 asked about the task description: (1) "Where does Kelly Harmon work?" and (2) "What is 237 a phishing email?" Embedded in the task were two email stimuli used as attention checks: 238 (3) "If you are reading this, please answer that this is a phishing email" and (4) "If you 239 are reading this, please answer that this is NOT a phishing email." Many participants saw 240 the "legitimate" stimulus check as suspicious, and identified it as phishing, thereby 241 failing the check (44 for Experiment 1 and 33 for Experiment 2). Therefore, we removed 242 it from the analysis. Attention was measured as a binary variable based on the first 3 243 checks. Rather than removing participants who failed checks, we used attention as a 244 predictor in the regression analyses (below). We found similar results (see Supplementary  245 Material) when excluding the 10 participants who failed two of three additional attention 246 checks: illogical response (e.g., clicking the link on an email identified as phishing), 247 spending less than 10 seconds on more than one email and d' < 0. 248
We measured the time spent on the phishing information (phish info time) and emails 249 (median time/email). We used gender, age and education to measure demographic 250 The order of the detection and behavior task was randomized across participants. 282
Sample 283
Of the 162 participants who started the experiment, 152 finished. They were paid 284 $5. According to self-reports, 58% were female and 45% had at least a Bachelor's 285 degree. The mean age was 32 years old, with a range from 19 to 59. (c = -0.54). This combination is equivalent to a miss rate of 28% and a false alarm rate of 320 61%, also punishingly high for many systems. Figure 2b shows the variability in 321 individual performance. Performance on the two tasks was correlated. Participants with a 322 high d' in the detection task tended to also have a higher d' for the behavior task, r(150) 323 = 0.61, p < .001. The same was true for response bias, r(150) = 0.66, p < .001. 324 Figure 3a shows responses on the behavior task, based on whether the participant 325 judged a message to be phishing or legitimate in the detection task. Although participants 326 sometimes acted cautiously with messages that they perceived as legitimate (e.g., 327
checking the link or sender), they rarely chose to "click link or open attachment" for 328 emails they perceived as phishing. Figure 3b shows these actions as a function of whether 329 the messages were actually legitimate or phishing. Given participants' imperfect 330 detection ability, behaviors consistent with their beliefs sometimes led to inappropriate 331 actions. Thus, despite the bias toward not clicking on links revealed in c B , participants 332 still succumbed to many phishing attacks. They knew what to do with legitimate and 333 phishing emails, just not which they were facing. 334 13.02*** 9.85*** Notes: *p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001 Confidence was evaluated from 0.5-1 and perceived consequences were evaluated from 1-5.
For the detection task, participants' sensitivity was positively correlated with their 377 confidence, consistent with having some metacognitive ability (i.e., knowing how much 378 they know). Participants who were more likely to treat emails as legitimate (i.e., higher 379 c D ) also tended to be more confident. Participants who saw more severe consequences 380
were less likely to identify emails as legitimate, but had no different sensitivity. For the 381 behavior task, participants who were more likely to click on links (i.e., higher c B ) tended 382 to be more confident and perceive fewer consequences. We observed no differences in 383 terms of sensitivity. 384
Model 3: Demographics. No demographic variable was a significant predictor of 385 d' or c, for either task, p > .01. 386
For both tasks, d' and c were unrelated to whether participants were notified of 387 the base rate or which task they completed first. Notification may have had no effect 388 because participants who received no notice assumed a base rate close to 50% (because it 389 was an experiment), or because those who received notice did not (or could not) 390 incorporate the stated base rate in their responses given that there was no feedback 391 (Goodie & Fantino, 1999; Newell & Rakow, 2007) . Task order might have had no effect 392 because, once participants performed both tasks on a few stimuli, the two merged in their 393 minds. Experiment 2 examines this possibility, as well as replicating the study as a 394 whole, by having each participant perform just one task. 395
Experiment 2 397

Procedure 398
Experiment 2 repeats the procedure of Experiment 1, except that participants were 399 randomly assigned to perform either the detection or the behavior task. 400
Sample 401
One hundred participants completed the online experiment, with 52 performing 402 the detection task and 48 the behavior task. Participants who had completed Experiment 1 403
were not eligible for Experiment 2 (and were screened using mTurk qualifications). They 404 were paid $5. The median time spent was 30 minutes. According to self-reports, 48% 405 were female and 40% had at least a Bachelor's degree. The mean age was 33 years old, 406 with a range of 19 to 60. 407
Of the 100 participants, 9 failed at least one attention check. 
Results & Discussion 414
In Experiment 2, participants explicitly performed only one of the two tasks. As 415 seen in Table 1 and Figure 2 , performance was remarkably similar to Experiment 1, 416 where participants performed both. Two-sided t-tests found no significant differences (p 417 > .05) between the studies, in sensitivity, response bias, confidence, or perceived 418 consequences. The Supplementary Materials provide additional detail. 419
One possible explanation for the similarity of the results in the two experiments is 420 that people implicitly make a detection decision when making a behavioral choice, and 421 vice versa. As a result, the second task is there implicitly, even when not performed 422 explicitly. If so, then the similarity of the results suggests the robustness of performance 423 on these tasks, which was also unaffected by the order in which they were performed and 424 whether the base-rate was stated. The few differences between the experiments, reported 425 in the Supplementary Materials, were in whether coefficients in the regressions were 426 above or below statistical significance (with the signs being consistent). 427
General Discussion 428
SDT disentangles and quantifies sensitivity and response bias. Here, we apply it 429 to distinguishing phishing emails from legitimate ones, looking separately at detection (is 430 this message phishing?) and behavior (how will you respond to it?), building on previous 431 behavior tasks were performed together or separately, which was done first (when 437 together), and whether the 50% base rate of phishing messages was stated explicitly. 438
Our results suggest four primary findings. First, participants' behavior almost 439 always reflected appropriate or cautious actions, given their detection beliefs (Figure 3) . 440
However, their imperfect detection ability meant that such conditionally appropriate 441 behavior still allowed many successful phishing attacks. Thus, it appears that users have 442 learned what to do about phishing, but not when to do it. 443
Second, the two tasks, deciding whether a message is legitimate and what to do 444 about it, are naturally intertwined. In Experiment 1, performance on the two tasks was 445 correlated, such that participants who had a higher d' for one also had higher d' for the 446 other. Moreover, performance was the same, whichever task was completed first, 447
suggesting that the two could not be separated. Experiment 2 found similar performance 448 with participants who explicitly performed just one of the tasks. Given how intertwined 449 the two tasks seem to be, interventions that address one might naturally address the other. 450
An intervention that succeeded in separating them might improve detection, by focusing 451 users on that task before moving on to behavior, and improve behavior, by allowing time 452 to reflect on the limits to their detection ability. However, as Herley (2009 Herley ( , 2014 ) 453 observed, slowing the process degrades the user experience, hence might be rejected, 454
even if that is just what users need. 455
Third, the differences between c D and c B suggest that participants used different 456 decision strategies for the two tasks. SDT research has found that participants' response 457 bias (c) is sensitive to both the base rate and the costs of correct and incorrect choices. 458
The present results suggest that all participants assumed roughly the same (50%) base 459 rate. Stating that rate explicitly made no difference in either experiment, nor was there 460 evidence of learning over the course of the experiment. Therefore, differences in c can be 461 attributed to differences in perceived costs. Although the experiment imposed no actual 462 costs, participants might reasonably have imported cost expectations from their everyday 463
lives. 464
Responses to the detection task indicated that most participants treated false 465 alarms as more costly than misses ( > 1), whereas the ratio was reversed for the 466 behavior tasks ( < 1). Wickelgren (1977) shows how, even when payoffs are clear, 467
people may lack the feedback needed to estimate how well they are achieving their 468 desired tradeoffs. Thus, our estimates of response bias represent the tradeoffs that 469 participants achieved, and not necessarily those that they intended. To the extent that 470 these estimates capture participants' actual preferences, they suggest users engage in 471 relatively lax screening for detection, in contrast to more rigorous evaluation for 472 behavior. The patterns observed in these two experiments were robust across three 495 manipulations that could, plausibly, have affected them, namely, notifying participants of 496 the base rate, separating the detection and behavior tasks, and varying their order. 497
Although that robustness increases confidence in these patterns, we would hesitate to 498 generalize the performance estimates observed here beyond the present experimental 499 setting. Speculatively, sensitivity might be better or worse with individuals' personal 500 emails, found in a more familiar context, but also amidst the distractions of everyday life, 501 where monitoring phishing is a secondary task. Indeed, performance here might be a 502 best-case scenario, with phishing the primary task and a high base rate of signals (Wolfe 503 et al., 2007) . Nonetheless, performance here was still imperfect, with evidence suggesting 504 that participants were trying: attention checks, orderly regression results, robustness ofreplication, and differential responses to the detection and behavior tasks that plausibly 506 reflect real-world sensitivity. 507
Overall, participants exhibited cautious, informed behavior. However, their 508 detection ability was sufficiently poor that their behavior could imperil computer systems 509 dependent on this human element. Based on these results, two promising places for 510 system operators to focus are helping users to understand the consequences of successful 511 phishing attacks and the validity of the signal sent by their own feelings of confidence. 512
Key points: 513
• Users had imperfect ability to determine whether email messages were legitimate 514 or phishing. 515
• Users knew how to deal with phishing attempts, but not always when to execute 516 those actions, given their limited detection ability. 517
• Interventions could focus on helping users to understand the consequences of 518 falling for phishing attacks and how much to trust their ability to detect them. 
